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This study compares the inherent intuitiveness or usability of the most prominent methods for managing uncertainty 
in expert systems, including those of EMYCIN, PROSPECTOR, Dempster-Shafer theory, Fuzzy set theory, 
simplified probability theory (assuming marginal independence}, and linear regression using probability estimates. 
Participants in the study gained experience in a simple, hypothetical problem domain through a series of learning 
trials. They were then randomly assigned to develop an expert system using one of the six Uncertain Inference 
Systems (UISs) listed above. Performance of the resuHing systems was then compared. The results indicate that 
the systems based on the PROSPECTOR and EMYCIN models were significantly less accurate for certain types 
of problems compared to systems based on the other UISs. Possible reasons for these dtfferences are discussed. 
1. INTRODUCnON 
Several methods of managing uncertainty in expert systems, or Uncertain Inference Systems (UISs), have been 
proposed or developed over the past twenty years, including those devised for the MYCIN [1] and PROSPECTOR 
[2] projects, methods based on fuzzy set theory [3] and Dempster-Shafer theory [4), approaches using 
simplifications of probability theory [e.g., assuming marginal independence; 5], among others. However, until recent 
years, little information, apart from theoretical or philosophical arguments, has been available to aid in the selection 
of a UIS for a particular application. Empirical studies comparing the algor�hmic accuracy of UISs began to appear 
about four years ago [e.g., 6, 7, 8], and later methodical improvements [9, 1 0] resulted in identffication of the 
relative lim�ations of several of these UISs under optimal cond�ions. 
Many of these approximate techniques were justified by their developers, at least in part, however, by arguing that 
their approach was more compatible wtth human mental representations and/or reasoning, more intu�ive, and thus, 
more practical to use. Heuristic parameters and .aQ � combining methods which resutt in algorithmic inaccuracy 
might be offset, the argument goes, ff humans can readily and accurately apply the approach to a given problem. 
These claims of enhanced ·usability• of the various UIS are virtually untested. 
Henrion and Cooley [11] and Heckerman [12] have reported single-expert case studies that compared UISs which 
were used to develop relatively large, complex applications. Such case studies provide useful insights into the 
system development process; however, it is difficult to separate the effect of the usability of the approach from 
• This research was conducted under the McDonnell Douglas Independent Research and Development program. 
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the numerous uncontrolled factors in an actual application. Some of these uncontrolled factors include 1) variation 
in factors other than the choice of a UIS, such as knowledge acquisition techniques, user interface, development 
environments, and the like, which are not an inherent feature of the UIS; 2) interference produced by requiring a 
single expert to provide multiple forms of parameter estimates and expectations or preferences of the expert for 
one of these forms over another; and 3) differences in the expectations, or where multiple individuals were involved, 
abilities of the system developers. Additionally, it is difficun to know how to generalize from the experience of a 
single individual to the broader issue of usability of a UIS or what can serve as an crtterion of accuracy independent 
of the judgments of the application expert. In all fairness to the authors of these studies, a comparison of the 
inherent usability of the UJS was not the primary focus of their work. 
Only a single study, one by Mitchell, Harp, and Simkin (13], was found which compared UIS under controlled learning 
and acquisition conditions. Unfortunately, participants in their study did not actually develop a system, but rather, 
estimated parameters which might be used in a system, such as a EMYCIN Certainty Factor (CF) for a change in 
belief in a conclusion given evidence. Thus, their participants were given no opportunity to observe the results of 
their parameter estimates, in terms of a system answer, and refine the estimates. Additionally, their study did not 
involve uncertainty in the observations of evidence, e.g., assigning a CF to the observed evidence, which makes 
drawing implications for uncertainty management even more problematic. 
The current study sought to control factors extraneous to inherent UIS differences as fully as practical, while 
providing all of the features necessary to build, test, and refine a working expert system. Differences in expertise 
were controlled by training the participants in a hypothetical problem domain to a criterion level of performance. 
Instructions to the participants were standardized and every effort was made to fully describe the essential 
features of the UIS without giving information that might influence individual parameter values or rules. The entire 
procedure, apart from the instructions and a questionnaire, was automated; the system development environments 
for each of the UISs provided only simple edttors and displays to minimize differences in knowledge acquisition and 
interface technologies. In short, the present study addressed the question of inherent usability of a UIS by 
examining how readily and accurately individuals could use the essential features of a given UIS. 
2.METHOD 
Participants in this study were 60 volunteers from McDonnell Douglas Corporation interested or involved in AI 
activtties. They varied widely in their knowledge of AI and in their experience with expert systems, ranging from 
relatively experienced knowledge engineers to managers of AI projects to personnel just introduced to the 
technology. Ten of these volunteers were randomly assigned to work with each of the six different UISs examined 
in this study. 
2.1 Learning Trials 
To assure comparable levels of expertise, the participants in the study gained experience in solving a hypothetical 
diagnostic problem through a series of learning trials. Spec�ically, the problem was to diagnose whether a fictttious 
machine was or was not maHunctioning according to temperature and pressure readings. During the learning trials, 
participants saw a temperature and a pressure on a computer terminal and responded by typing an ·M· for 
maHunction or a "W" for working, depending on which they believed most likely given the readings. They were then 
informed of the correct answer for that particular case, and a new temperature/pressure was presented to begin a 
new trial. This process continued until the participant achieved an average level of accuracy over 20 consecutive 
trials equal to about 85% correct, near optimal performance given the inherent unpredictabiltty of the outcome. 
Problems for the learning (and test trials, which are described later) were generated in accordance with the 
probability of their occurrence, as indicated by the contingency table given in Table 1. For example, problems for 
which both temperature and pressure were high (abnormal) and the machine was maHunctioning were generated, on 
average, in 0.315 of the cases. The condttional probabilnies of the conclusion (malfunction) given the various states 
of the evidence are as follows: P(Cj�E1&�E2) = probability of malfunction given normal temperature and normal 
pressure 
= 0.1; P(Cj�E1&E2) = P(CIE1 &�E2) = 0.2; and P(C!E1 &E2) = 0.9. The table is therefore conjunctive in 
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nature, in that a maHunction is likely when both temperature and pressure are high {0.9} and unlikely otherwise (0.2 
or less). 
TABLE 1. THE CONTINGENCY TABLE FROM WHICH PROBLEMS WERE GENERATED 
EVIDENCE CONCLUSION 
WORKING (�C) MALFUNCTION {C} 
NORMAL TEMPERATURE (�E1\f 0.315 O.o35 NORMAL PRESSURE (�E2) 
NORMAL TEMPERATURE (�E1)/ 0.120 0.030 HIGH PRESSURE (E2) 
HIGH TEMPERATURE (E1)/ 0.120 0.030 NORMAL PRESSURE (-E2) 
HIGH TEMPERATURE (E1)/ 0.035 0.315 HIGH PRESSURE (E2) 
The actual temperature and pressure readings were generated after it had been determined which cell of the 
contingency table a particular problem was to represent. We sampled from normal distributions with different 
means depending on whether the problem represented a normal or a high reading. Means and standard deviations 
for the normal and high temperature and pressure distributions are given in Table 2. Thus, atthough problem 
presentation was controlled by a contingency table and sampling from normal distributions, there was nothing in the 
display or the instructions that suggested one interpretation of the problem was more appropriate than another. 
Problem displays and the instructions were intentionally vague on issues such as whether the abnormal 
temperature and pressure readings were symptoms or causes of the malfunction, whether or not the uncertainty 
was primarily in the readings (e.g., sensor unreliability} or in the relation between the readings and the conclusion, 
and what the exact likelihood of malfunction was when neither, either, or both readings were abnormal. 
t.rt:IN sro.a:v. 
100.0 5.0 
200.  5.0 
70.0 3.0 
82.0 3.0 
2.2 System Building & Tuning Trials 
Study participants then used one of six UISs to build, test, and refine a system that captured their knowledge 
about the diagnosis problem. The study included UIS implementations based on the EMYCIN and PROSPECTOR 
models, simplified probability theory (assuming marginal independence of the evidence), linear regression using 
probabilities, fuzzy set theory, and Dempster-Shaler theory. The UJS's relevant features were described and 
illustrated in written instructions, and every attempt was made to make the descriptions for the different UISs 
comparable in the amount and level of detail of the information. The following overview of the approaches we 
studied is only intended to provide an appreciation of some of the major differences between the UISs; for a lull 
explication of the models, the interested reader should consuH the references cited. 
(a) EMYCIN & PROSPECTOR. Althaug,h diUerent in computation and parameters, the EMYCIN [1} and 
PROSPECTOR [2] UISs have similar rule formats. Both UISs allow simple rules, which relate one piece of 
evidence with the conctusion, and conjunctive ("AND"} and disjunctive ("OR") rules, which relate a particular type 
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of evidence combination to the conclusion. Each of these UISs requires estimation of one or more parameters for 
each rule {EMYCIN requires a single parameter, a CF to specify the strength of the link between evidence and 
conclusion, while PROSPECTOR requires two, a Logical Sufficiency and a Logical Necesshy). CFs are estimated 
on a -1 to + 1 scale, while the PROSPECTOR parameters are estimated on a +6 to -6 scale. Addhionally, the 
participants using the PROSPECTOR UIS must estimate a prior odds for the evidence of each rule and the 
conclusion, this on a scale of +4 to -4. Verbal descriptors of these scale values have been provided by the 
developers and were available to the study participants. 
(b) Linear Regression & Simplified Probability (Independence). Equations (1) and (2) below define the regression 
and simplified probability (or independence) models, respectively. The parameters for both are probabilities, 
expressed on a zero-to-one scale (the procedure implemented actually requested proportions to express relations). 
P'(C) =a+ b1 * P'(E1} + b2 * P'(E2} 
P'(C) 
= 
P'(NE1) * P'(�E2) * P(Ci�E1&NE2) + 
P'(-E 1) * P'(E2) * P(C1-E1&E2) + 
P'(E1) 
* P'(-E2) * P(CIE1 &-E2) + 
P'(E1) * P'(E2) * P(CIE1&E2) 
(1) 
(2) 
The regression UIS required an estimated proportion of cases that would have a malfunction when nehher piece of 
evidence was present, corresponding to the intercept •a· in equation (1 ), and the proportion when each piece of 
evidence was present, corresponding to the weights "bl" and "b2". The independence UIS required an estimate of 
the proportions when neither, both, and ehher piece of evidence alone was present, for a total of tour parameters. 
Nothing corresponding to rule selection is required under these approaches, as the form of the relations is specified 
by the models. 
(c) Fuzzy Set & Dempster-Shaler Theory. Both of these UISs represent broad conceptual theories of 
uncertainty, and so, they present a variety of atternative implementations. In both cases, we chose one of the 
more simple, straightforward implementations, but one we believed was adequate for the problem. Certainly, 
additional empirical research into these alternatives is warranted. 
Our implementation of fuzzy set theory (3] used fuzzy membership functions and rule specnication. Participants 
using this UIS described a membership function which mapped particular evidence values onto their rules. The 
membership function required eight parameters for each type of evidence. Four of these parameters indicated the 
high and low values of an interval over which the evidence was deemed definhely present (the bounded values of 
temperature or pressure were definitely "high") and the high and low points of an interval over which the evidence 
was deemed definitely absent. The remaining four parameters indicated the interval over which the evidence was 
considered uncertain. Rules were ehher simple or conjunctive, and the strength of the rules was expressed as a 
probability. These forms of membership functions and rule sets are based loosely on those described and illustrated 
by Bonissone and Decker (14]. 
Our implementation of Dempster-Shafer theory {4] used simple support functions combined using Dempster's rule. 
The frame of discernment for the problem in this study was the set {working, malfunctioning} and each reading 
(temperature or pressure) was taken to be compatible whh one, but not both of these conclusions.. For example, a 
reading that supported the conclusion that the mechanism was malfunctioning did not support the conclusion that it 
was working. To estimate the support for a conclusion given a reading, participants were asked to estimate the 
readings which supported the following beliefs: 
Bel(working) = 0.999, Bel{ malfunction) ""0.0; 
Bel(working) = 0.50, Bel( malfunction) = 0.0; 
Bel(working) = 0.0, Bel(malfunction) = 0.0; 
Bel(working) = 0:0, Bel( malfunction) "" 0.50; and 
Bel{working} = 0.0, Bel(malfunction) = 0.999. 
These points defined a support function, and linear interpolation was used to estimate beliefs for evidence readings 
falling between those points supplied by the participants. Finally, Dempste(s rule was used to combine beliefs. 
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Once the systems were developed, the participants tested them using temperature and pressure values of their 
own choosing. H the system answer, which was in a form appropriate to the UIS, disagreed w�h their own 
evaluation, simple editors were available to modify any of the UIS's features. Testing and refining continued 
tteratively until the participant was satisfied wtth the system's performance. 
2.3 Test Trials 
Finally, each system was used to diagnose thirty test cases and the participants completed a brief questionnaire 
describing their background and their impressions of the UIS they had used. Throughout the study, participants 
were encouraged to ask any questions they wished. Questions requesting clarification of procedures and the like 
were answered at any time to the participant's satisfaction. If a participant asked a question pertaining 
specifically to the problem domain or to implementing their solution in a given UIS, the experimenter explained that 
figuring such things out was part of the task at hand. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSlON 
Tests of mean differences suggest that the experimental procedure was effective in creating groups with roughly 
equivalent backgrounds and understanding of the problem domain. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests of the 
background charaderistics, which included ttems on exposure to AI and expert systems methodologies, revealed no 
significant differences between the groups assigned to use the different UISs [maximum F(5,53) = 0.88, p < 0.50]. 
Likewise, we found no differences between groups in the number of trials taken to reach the learning criterion 
[F(5,54) = 0.21, p < 0.96). 
We also tested for the clarity or ease of use of the UISs in two ways: 1} in the self-reported ratings of 
comprehensiveness, consistency, and ease of use of the UIS from the questionnaire administered at the end of the 
session; and 2) in the effort expended to tune a given UIS to the satisfaction of the participant. ANOVA tests 
indicated the groups were not significantly different in the self-reported ratings [maximum F(5,53) = 1.56, p < 0.19]. 
This finding may imply that the UISs are equivalent in terms of clarity. It is also possible, however, that the 
participants, who used only one of the UIS during the study, lacked any basis for comparison. 
Differences in the average number of trials the participants spent in tuning the different UISs are given in Table 3. 
An ANOVA indicated that the groups differed significantly [F(5,54) = 2.63, p < 0.04), w�h participants using the 
linear regression approach requiring the fewest trials, while those applying the PROSPECTOR UIS needing more 
than twice as many trials, on the average. The difference in the number of tuning trials may reflect the relative 
clarity or ease of use of the approaches; however, � may simply be related to the number of distinct parameters 
that must be estimated. The linear regression approach involves the estimation of the fewest parameters, only 
three, while participants using PROSPECTOR estimated an average of 13.0 parameters. Once this variance (in 
the number of parameters) was taken into account using analysis of covariance, the groups did not differ 
sign�icantly in the number of trials to tune their systems [F(5,53) = 0.42, p < 0.83]. 
N:>. a=lRAL.S 
EMVCI\I 
9.5 
PF03P. 
19.3 
GOP 
t-J:El. l.JilAFI:G. R.IZZYSET 
113 8.1 1a5 
DSI-VtffR 
10.0 
We evaluated six different measures to assess the accuracy of the participants' systems on the final thirty test 
trials; however, all six revealed the same pattern of findings. Consequently, for simplicity, we will report resu�s 
based on the proportion of correct diagnoses by the system compared to the answer used to generate the problem 
(i.e., the cell of the contingency table sampled). The ANOVA for this index showed a significant main effect for 
trials and a significant trials by UIS interaction. The summary ANOVA table for this analysis is given as Table 4. 
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The significant trials by UIS interaction [F(145,1566) = 1.58, p < 0.01] indicates substantial variation among the 
UISs in their accuracy given different types of trials. 
TAEI..E4. � N¥JVATABLE�PRJPORTO.U:XJFPECT 
DW.'N)3ES 
guq; _DE_ ...sa_ __Mi... ..£. 
l£llMB.I 59 52.53 
us 5 5.41 1.CB 1.24 
SWJ(UIS) 54 47.12 om 
� 174) 259.47 
'ffiiAI..S 29 71.50 2.47 22.36" 
UIS"'TRWS 145 25.29 0.17 tsa· 
TRIAl..S"S(UIS) 1500 17l.68 0.11 
TOTAL 1700 322.0 
1'<0.01 
Further evaluation of the trial by UIS interaction revealed that, on average, systems developed using the six UlSs 
were equally accurate given ·consistent" evidence, that is, when both temperature and pressure readings were 
normal or both were high. However, performance of the different UISs varied widely when the evidence was 
"mixed" or conflicting, i.e., one of the readings was high while the other was normal. These results are summarized 
in Table 5. A Tukey test of these mean differences indicated that the systems developed using the EMYCIN and 
PROSPECTOR UISs were significantly less accurate given mixed evidence than they, or any of the UISs were, 
when given consistent evidence. 
EMVCN 
0.90 
031 
PR:SP. 
0.85 
0.26 
GO.P 
taP. 
OJfl 
0.74 
L.NR FEG.  
0.85 
0.53 
RJZZYSET 
0.84 
057 
DSt-Wffi 
O.!n 
0.60 
There are several possible explanations why systems buitt using the EMYCIN and PROSPECTOR UISs might be 
less accurate given mixed evidence. Although � is not likely, perhaps the developers of these systems had an 
incorrect impression of the likelihood of a malfunction given mixed information -- an impression not held by 
developers of the other types of systems. A second possibility is that system developers using the EMYCIN or 
PROSPECTOR UISs failed to write rules covering the mixed evidence cases or the rules they wrote were 
internally inconsistent. Third, although the rule base may be complete and consistent, K might be the case that the 
parameter values expressing the strength of the relations were inaccurately estimated. Finally, given equally well 
developed rule bases and equally accurate parameter estimates for the problem domain, it may be that the 
EMYCIN and PROSPECTOR UISs are less robust to the inaccuracies that exist in all the models. 
We found support only for the third possibility, that the EMYCIN and PROSPECTOR parameters were 
inaccurately estimated. Table 6 shows the average parameter estimates (standardized on a zero to one scale) for 
each of the two types of mixed evidence cases -- normal temperature/high pressure or high temperature/normal 
pressure --for each of the UISs. ANOVAs indicated significant differences among the UISs for both the normal 
temperature/high pressure parameter estimates [F(5,54) = 8.75, p < 0.01] and for the high pressure/normal 
pressure estimates [F(5,54) = 5.20, p < 0.01]. In general, the mixed case parameter values for EMYCIN and 
PROSPECTOR were inflated compared to the other UISs. Additionally, the PROSPECTOR and EMYCIN based 
systems were found to overestimate the likelihood of malfunction in mixed cases, even though the participants using 
these UISs were found to be no more likely than other participants to guess malfunction given mixed evidence in the 
learning trials. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Taken together, we believe the results of this research suggest that the rule-based approaches of EMYCIN and 
PROSPECTOR pose knowledge representation difficulties that are largely circumvented in the other, more 
structured methods. But before reviewing these implications, H is important to recognize some of the limitations of 
the research that is reported here. First, tt may be that the knowledge captured in the present study is different in 
important ways from knowledge accrued through years of experience, the commonly recognized goal of an expert 
system. While it is not clear that a rule-based approach is a more appropriate or accurate method of representing 
that compiled knowledge, additional empirical research addressing the usability of the different UISs for encoding 
practical expertise is sorely needed . 
A second possible limHation of the current study stems from the simple nature of the problem domain -- only two 
pieces of evidence were relevant to diagnosing a manunction in the hypothetical mechanism. It is possible that in 
complex situations, where numerous sources of information bear on several different conclusions, that humans are 
capable of encoding only simple relations of the sort represented by the idealized conjunctive, disjunctive, or simple 
rules. Under this circumstance, the disadvantage of the rule-based UISs might disappear. Further research is also 
needed to evaluate this possibility. 
Finally, the current study should not be interpreted as an indication of the potential or optimal performance of the 
different UISs. Clearly, all of the UISs evaluated in this study couki be used to develop an accurate model of the 
simple problem domain; at least one very accurate system was developed using each of the different UISs in our 
study. Thus, this research does not necessarily reflect the final performance an experienced system developer 
might be able to achieve using any of the approaches studied. The study does, in our opinion, reflect the 
intuitiveness or inherent usability of the various approaches and, to the extent that this influences important 
system building processes such as the transfer of information, the accuracy of the final application may be 
substantially affected. 
The primary question raised by this research is why, when their performance in the learning trials indicated they 
knew the correct response, did participants using the EMYCIN and PROSPECTOR UISs build systems which 
overestimated the likelihood of manunction in mixed evidence cases? While the present study has no data that 
directly bear on this question, the pattern of findings that emerged suggest that the developers using the EMYCIN 
and PROSPECTOR UISs found tt difficu� to tune simu�aneously to both the typical, consistent evidence case and 
the atypical, mixed case. The evidence clearly suggests that the inaccuracy of the systems given mixed evidence 
was not due to oversight on the part of the developers. In fact, the EMYCIN and PROSPECTOR systems that 
contained explictt rules and parameter estimates for mixed evidence cases were, in general, less accurate than 
those that relied on default values for their estimate. Rather, it appears that the EMYCIN and PROSPECTOR 
developers found � difficu� to identify and understand the interaction of parameters in their rule-based model of the 
problem domain. 
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